This paper provides an analysis of non-cooperative tariff-setting in the presence on foreign direct investment. We set up a two-country general equilibrium model with co-existence of exporters and horizontal multinational firms. For symmetric countries, analytical results are derived. The theoretical analysis is enriched by numerical simulation exercises to provide a concise picture of how asymmetries in the economic fundamentals of countries affect our analytical findings. The main hypotheses are confirmed by empirical results from panel regressions. In particular, our findings support the theoretically appealing idea that tariff rates are higher when horizontal multinational firms are prevalent.
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Non-Technical Summary
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have a central role in shaping the development of the world economy. Foreign direct investment (FDI) over the last few decades has grown spectacularly: annual inflows were $60 billion in 1982 and are now over $700 billion; whilst over the same period total stocks have grown from $800 billion to over $8,000 billion. This has resulted in 'multinationality' of firms becoming a key driver of the current wave of globalisation. Over this same period trade policy and changes in trade policy have also been centre stage. Even though average tariff levels in OECD countries have declined significantly since World War II trade policy and tariff levels remain controversial in some areas.
The presence of MNEs not only impacts on a country's economic prosperity, they also affect the fortunes of national exporting firms (NEs) by changing their competitive environment in both product and factor markets. In this regard, horizontal MNEs are of special interest for two reasons. First, the preponderance of FDI of developed countries in other, large developed economies indicates that this mode of FDI is important. There is implicit evidence for a dominance of horizontal, trade-cost-jumping FDI over vertical, low-cost-seeking FDI. Second, the mode of a firm's entry as a horizontal MNE versus an NE is characterized by what has become known as the proximity-concentration trade-off ie., the trade-off of serving foreign consumers locally through foreign plant production by saving trade costs at the expense of higher fixed costs (proximity) versus exporting from a single plant by saving fixed costs at the expense of trade costs (concentration). Tariffs affect this trade-off, which renders the analysis of trade policy in general equilibrium with MNEs an important issue. This our focus on in this paper.
The paper builds on previous research and studies non-cooperative tariff determination in a general equilibrium model of trade and horizontal MNEs. For this, we set up a two-sector, two-country model of imperfect competition, which explicitly distinguishes between the physical-capital-serving and the knowledge-capital-serving nature of headquarters for their foreign affiliates We thus account for human capital (or skilled labour) and physical capital as distinct endowment parameters. Like other general equilibrium models of MNEs, one sector is characterized by a large variety of monopolistically competitive firms (NEs and MNEs), while the second (homogeneous sector) serves as the numéraire.
In the empirical part of the paper, we bring our model to the data and assess its main theoretical predictions. For this, we use a spatial econometric approach that allows us to account for cross-country interdependencies. Such interdependencies are an important feature of the world economy but are typically paid scant attention in empirical analysis.
Introduction
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have a central role in shaping the development of the world economy. Foreign direct investment (FDI) over the last few decades has grown spectacularly:
annual inflows were $60 billion in 1982 and are now over $700 billion; whilst over the same period total stocks have grown from $800 billion to over $8,000 billion. This has resulted in 'multinationality' of firms becoming a key driver of the current wave of globalisation. Over this same period trade policy and changes in trade policy have also been centre stage. Even though average tariff levels in OECD countries have declined significantly since World War II, and mostly so way before the wave of MNE activity, trade policy and tariff levels remain controversial in some areas. 1 The presence of MNEs not only impacts on a country's economic prosperity as measured by GDP per capita. MNEs also affect the fortunes of national exporting firms (NEs) by changing their competitive environment in both product and factor markets. In this regard, horizontal MNEs are of special interest for two reasons. First, the preponderance of FDI of developed countries in other, large developed economies indicates that this mode of FDI is important.
There is implicit evidence for a dominance of horizontal, trade-cost-jumping FDI (Markusen, 1984 , Markusen and Venables, 1998 , 2000 over vertical, low-cost-seeking FDI (Helpman, 1984, Helpman and Krugman, 1985) .
2 Second, the mode of a firm's entry as a horizontal MNE versus an NE is characterized by what has become known as the proximityconcentration trade-off (Brainard, 1993 (Brainard, , 1997 . ie., the trade-off of serving foreign consumers locally through foreign plant production by saving trade costs at the expense of higher fixed costs (proximity) versus exporting from a single plant by saving fixed costs at the expense of trade costs (concentration). Tariffs affect this trade-off, which renders the analysis of trade policy in general equilibrium with MNEs an important issue. This our focus on in this paper.
A large part of the literature on trade policy analyses non-cooperative, best-response tariff setting, mostly in a static framework. Johnson (1953) and Horwell (1966) are two pioneering studies and Burbidge and Myers (2004) is a more recent example. By contrast, Staiger (1997a, 1997b ) pursue a dynamic approach with an infinite repetition of a static tariff game to determine the outside options of trade negotiations. 3 Economists have also analysed the impact of national political factors (Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1994) Markusen and Venables (2000) . However, we explicitly distinguish between the physicalcapital-serving and the knowledge-capital-serving nature of headquarters for their foreign affiliates (see Lipsey, 2002, and , on this notion). In doing so, we account for human capital (or skilled labour) and physical capital as distinct endowment parameters. Like other general equilibrium models of MNEs, one sector is characterized by a large variety of monopolistically competitive firms (NEs and MNEs), while the second (homogeneous sector) serves as the numéraire.
Given weak empirical evidence of a sizeable impact of political considerations on trade policy 6 and for the sake of simplicity, we abstain from modelling political factors. The proposed framework is simple enough to render analytical solutions for Nash tariff-setting feasible under symmetry. However, to get a concise picture of how asymmetries in the economic fundamentals impact on reaction functions, we augment our theoretical analysis by insights based on numerical simulation.
In the empirical part of the paper, we bring our model to the data and assess its main theoretical predictions. For this, we use a spatial econometric approach that allows us to 3 In their footnote 9, Baier and Bergstrand (2003) refer to this as an "ideal approach". Among others, Krugman (1991) and Bond and Syropoulos (1996) analyze Nash tariffs in case of preferential trade agreements. 4 Bagwell and Staiger (1999) build on Baldwin (1987) Grossman and Helpman (1995) have noted that "none of the studies includes any regressors relating to foreign political and economic conditions and thus they assume that international interdependence is unimportant or that foreign industry conditions are uncorrelated with those at home", an assumption at odds with insights of general equilibrium models of trade.
Even though well-respected empirical evidence points to a limited role for political factors in a government's objective function when deciding upon trade policy and although political variables are not given attention in our theoretical model, one might want to reduce and at best eliminate their influence on the outcome in a regression analysis. Unfortunately, lack of available data prevents us from explicitly controlling for political factors. Even empirical research that aims at explicitly estimating the role of these factors is faced with this limitation.
As Goldberg and Maggi (1999, 1140) Our findings suggest that the variation in trade-weighted tariffs is related in a systematic way to the hypotheses derived from our theoretical model. Specifically, we find that tariff rates are strategic complements in equilibrium. From our general equilibrium model with MNEs, we hypothesize that countries with abundant skilled labor will set higher import tariffs. This is consistent with our empirical evidence. Also the impact of investment costs and (inbound and outbound) FDI stocks give support to our theoretical analysis. Overall, we find that the impact of foreign economies' endowments and other characteristics should not be neglected. This underpins the importance of the warning in Grossman and Helpman (1995) that ignoring international interdependence in empirical work on this issue potentially leads to biased parameter estimates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out the structure of our general equilibrium model. In Section 3 we provide an analytical discussion of bestresponse tariffs in the symmetric equilibrium, and in Section 4 we discuss optimum noncooperative tariffs for the case of asymmetrically endowed economies by means of numerical 3 analysis. Sections 5 and 6 contain the empirical analysis and provide several extensions to check robustness. The last section concludes with a short summary of the most important insights.
A General Equilibrium Model of Trade and Horizontal Multinationals
We consider a model of two countries and two sectors. In the industrial X-sector differentiated goods are supplied under monopolistic competition, while firms in the Y-sector are perfectly competitive and produce a homogeneous good. Preferences of consumers are represented by a
Cobb-Douglas utility function:
where ,
7 Production technologies in the two sectors are represented by x L = and Y L = , respectively, where L is low-skilled labour.
In addition, production in the X-sector requires fixed set-up costs through the use of physical capital K and high-skilled non-production labour S. (In the following, we use the terms highskilled labour and human capital interchangeably.) We choose good Y as the numéraire and, thus, obtain under diversification in the production of both economies (which is assumed from now on). Export of industrial output is impeded by iceberg transport costs.
These are accounted for by parameter t>1 below. Moreover, there may be tariffs on international transactions of industrial goods. Following Venables (1987) and Ludema (2002) , trade in the numéraire good is not subject to any trade frictions. We consider two types of firms, exporters and horizontal multinationals. To headquarter a firm in a particular economy requires one unit of physical capital and one of human capital.
Local production can start immediately, without further investment. However, if a firm sets up a second production plant abroad, 1 g − (with ) units of physical capital have to be invested as a fixed factor input before production can be started Demand in country i for a single variety of the differentiated good is given by 
is total income (equal to total expenditures) of country i and is a price index. , and , are the numbers of exporters and horizontal multinationals of countries i and j, respectively. Each firm produces one variety so the number of monopolistically competitive firms equals the number of varieties. Profit maximization leads to a constant price mark-up and, therefore, to prices and In equilibrium, goods markets are cleared, implying
according to (2), where
is a transformed measure of iceberg transport costs. In addition, zero-profit conditions of country i firms are represented by
if . Finally, we assume that all factor inputs are inelastically supplied in perfectly competitive and internationally segmented markets. Then, the factor market clearing conditions in country i are given by 
From (4) and (5), we obtain
for equilibrium factor prices. In addition,
determine the equilibrium numbers of horizontal multinationals and exporters in country i, according to (7) and (8). (Equivalent expressions are obtained for quantities, factor prices, and firm numbers in j.) Positive factor prices and a positive number of both firm types require that countries are not too different and
. This is assumed throughout our analysis.
In our model, the number of exporters and multinationals is determined by endowments of human and physical capital and the investment cost parameter , according to i g (10). This implies that variety effects, as typically considered in models with monopolistic competition and CES preferences, do not arise as long as factor endowments and the investment cost parameter are fixed. As a consequence, general equilibrium mechanisms work through output adjustments (and not through variety effects). It is this (admittedly simplifying) assumption that allows us to account for income effects in an analytically solvable general equilibrium model with coexisting exporters and multinational firms in the industrial sector.
For tractability, we assume that countries i and j do not differ in their physical capital requirements for setting up a multinational firm, i.e., i j g g g = ≡ . Moreover, countries are presumed to exhibit identical endowments of physical and human capital, i.e., j
and , while they may differ in their endowments of low-skilled labour, i.e., 
(
Differentiating (11) with respect to yields
Egger, Egger, and Greenaway (2005) show that given 2 ε ≥ there exists, for any , a unique best-response tariff rate (1,
The results of Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 are depicted in Figure 1 . The reaction functions are constructed using numerical simulation. In particular, Figure 1 illustrates that reaction functions are non-monotonic in general, but positively sloped in the Nash equilibrium. Hence, from Proposition 1 and Figure 1 we can conclude that tariff rates are strategic complements in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Lemma 1 also shows that changes in the country-specific endowments with factor L do not influence non-cooperative tariff-setting, as long as diversification in the pattern of production is guaranteed. In all other respects, countries are assumed to be identical. In a next step, we will relax some of the strong symmetry assumptions underlying the results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Asymmetries in (physical and human) capital endowments and the investment cost parameter g are of particular interest, since the focus of our paper is on the role of foreign direct investment (which directly depends on these fundamentals) for non-cooperative tariff-setting. To investigate asymmetries, we have to apply numerical simulation techniques, as the complexity of the model makes an analytical discussion difficult (if not impossible). 
Endowment and Investment Cost Asymmetries: A Simulation Analysis
To facilitate the exposition, we assume i
Moreover, we allow for leading to country-specific costs of setting up foreign production plants.
Throughout the simulation exercises, we focus on interior solutions with both exporters and multinationals active in equilibrium.
To provide intuition for the main results, it is useful to introduce the concept of indirect utility. According to (1) and the CES-index X, indirect utility of the representative consumer in i is given by ( ) 
rates in Nash equilibrium. Accordingly, we can distinguish between a price and an income motive of governments when interpreting subsequent simulation results. Thus, a strong negative price effect is associated with low tariff rates, while a strong positive income effect is associated with high tariff rates (for a given policy of the partner country).
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From the analysis in Section 3, we know that endowment differences in L do not affect bestresponse tariff rates, according to Lemma 1. As a consequence, Nash tariff rates are symmetric as long as countries only differ in their endowments with low-skilled labour (and production remains diversified, see Proposition 1). Things are different, if countries also differ in endowments of (human and physical) capital or with regard to the factor requirements for setting up multinational firms. Then, tariff rates in Nash equilibrium are no longer symmetric as can be seen from Figures 2 and 3.
11 Differences in the relative endowments of and are implicitly accounted for by differences in K S i g and j g . conclude that for low levels of i μ the negative price effect is high (relative to the positive income effect), so tariffs are set at a low level in i. By contrast, if i μ is large and, thus, country i is well endowed with human and physical capital, foreign products have a relatively small weight in its consumption basket, since the number of local producers is large relative to the number of importers. As a consequence, the negative impact of higher consumer prices of imported goods is relatively small and the income motive relatively strong, so country i sets high tariff rates for high levels of i μ . However, the endowment effect is non-monotonic. . Hence, -variation along the red curves comprises two effects: a factor requirement difference and a factor requirement level effect. By contrast, the black loci represent a pure g-difference effect. To be more precise, the black curves indicate the impact of an increase in investment costs of a multinational located in country i with an affiliate in j relative to the investment costs of a country j firm with a plant in country i. Comparing red and black curves allows us to disentangle "level effects" (associated with changes in the average level of investment costs ) and pure "difference effects", associated with changes in the ratio for given average investment costs. − have a similar impact on Nash tariffs. As a consequence, bigger differences endowments of human and physical capital (for a given overall world endowment) may be offset by higher pure investment cost differences, if multinationals in a capital-abundant country face a disadvantage in terms of investment costs for setting up an overseas plant. In this respect, the intuition for the -effect is similar to that for the
In a further simulation experiment, we have investigated the impact of transport costs on the size of Nash tariff rates. The results are represented in Figure 4 . The left panel reproduces the Nash tariff associated with pure relative endowment differences (similar to the black loci in Figure 2 ) for different levels of transport cost parameter t, while in the right panel Nash tariffs associated with pure relative investment cost differences (similar to the black curves in Figure   3 ) are depicted for different t levels. As can be seen, higher transport costs tend to mitigate the negative price effect relative to the positive income effect. Therefore, governments have an incentive to set higher Nash tariff rates. 16 The t-effect is symmetric for both economies since we do not account for country-specific differences in the size of transport costs. 16 The finding that higher transport costs shift the Nash tariff rates upwards has been confirmed for a large set of different transport cost levels in the empirically relevant interval 1 2 t < ≤ .
In a final set of simulation exercises (not drawn), we have investigated the slope of reaction functions in Nash equilibrium. Consistent with Proposition 1, we find in a large panel of different exercises that -irrespective of cross-country asymmetries -reaction functions are positively sloped in Nash equilibrium, i.e., 
Empirical Analysis
Based on our theoretical framework, we set up an empirical model to estimate both the determinants of Nash tariffs and slope of the reaction function. For this analysis, we use tariff data from United Nation TRAINS database ( According to our theoretical model, the position and slope of tariff reaction functions depend on endowment parameters, trade and investment costs. These variables are accounted for in the empirical analysis. A We follow the established literature on the determinants of trade volumes (e.g., Bergstrand 1985 Bergstrand , 1989 to associate bilateral trade costs with bilateral distance measured in miles between economic centres (based on the great circle distance between capitals). Distance is time-invariant and, thus, controlled for by country-specific fixed effects.
Beyond its direct impact, distance also matters for the importance of foreign countries' characteristics, such as endowments. In line with our theoretical results, we can conclude that higher distance reduces dependency on foreign economies and, therefore, raises Nash tariff rates (see Figure 4) . Greater distance may therefore be interpreted as a step towards autarky.
For all countries, we can construct a bilateral distance matrix with zero diagonal entries and inverse bilateral distances in the other cells. We row-normalize the entries of this so that all elements in the same row sum to one (henceforth, we refer to this row-normalized matrix as ). Since countries are repeatedly observed in the data, is block-diagonal, consisting of blocks . We pre-multiply the vectors of foreign countries' factor endowments and trade-weighted tariffs by to obtain the spatially weighted variables. This procedure ensures that the importance of a foreign country's characteristics for a country's Nash tariffs declines in distance. Note that the latter effect of distance is not controlled for by fixed country effects. interval. Accordingly, we logistically transform tariffs to obtain unbiased parameter estimates.
In the empirical analysis, therefore, always refer to transformed tariff values. Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables used. - Table 1 -15 We estimate four versions of (13) using the GMM approach of Kelejian and Prucha (1999) . Table 2 summarizes our findings.
- Table 2 Fixed country effects enter significantly in all estimated models. Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 Finally, the significant coefficients of low-skilled labour endowments ( 4 0 β > and 7 0 β < ) are more difficult to interpret. In our theoretical analysis, we have derived the hypothesis for the impact of lowskilled labour endowments on Nash tariffs under three simplifying assumptions to keep the model tractable: (i) complete symmetry in every other respect (i.e., high-skilled labour and physical capital endowments, investment costs), (ii) low-skilled labour is not used to create plant-specific or firm-specific assets, whilst both human and physical capital are not employed in production, and (iii) production is diversified. In this case, low-skilled labour rewards are identical across economies and low-skilled labour endowments irrelevant for tariff setting. However, production cost asymmetries may be empirically important, rendering low-skilled labour endowments relevant for equilibrium tariffs. In our dataset, we find lowskilled labour endowments affect equilibrium tariffs in similar ways to high-skilled labour endowments (potentially due to complementarities of low-and high-skilled labour in industrial production). Table 3 summarizes the findings of a sensitivity analysis. Seven modifications of our benchmark model are considered. First, we reduce the importance of distant countries in spatial weighting. Instead of using inverse distances, we rely on squared inverse distances. It turns out that this modification has no impact on parameter signs, indicating robustness .
Sensitivity Analysis and Extensions
- Third, we assess the role of outliers, which we define as observations outside the range of two standard deviations around the mean of Hadi's (1992 Hadi's ( , 1994 measure in multivariate samples.
Altogether, nine observations are classified as influential based on this method. However, excluding these has little effect on our general conclusions. The finding of a positive slope of the Nash reaction function is robust in this regard, and the parameter signs of exogenous variables do not change.
Fourth and fifth, we consider a separate estimation of Model 4 on the sub-samples of developed and developing economies. In our model, we have focused on horizontal multinationals, although it is characterized by considerable factor cost differences. Hence, vertical multinationals might coexist. 21 We find in either case the slope of the tariff reaction function is positive. Moreover, the signs of all explanatory variables' parameters are not affected. Interestingly, the negative (positive) impact of ( ) on domestic Nash tariffs is mitigated in developed countries characterized by more similar factor endowments than the pooled sample. This lends support to our discussion of non-monotonic endowment effects This may be explained by the capacity of the instruments to identify both FDI and spatially weighted tariffs simultaneously. Therefore, we have to focus on the determinants of equilibrium tariffs,(rather than on the slope of the reaction function).
- Table 4 - The results in Table 4 refer to the impact of foreign direct investment on tariff rates. Three different measures of FDI are applied: (i) the sum of inbound and outbound stocks of foreign investment, (ii) inbound stocks of foreign investment, and (iii) outbound stocks of foreign investment. For the latter, only a smaller sample of observations is available (due to their availability in World Investment Report tables).
We find that both the sum of inbound and outbound FDI as well as inbound FDI alone has a positive impact on the tariff rate; although the point estimate for outbound FDI is also positive it is insignificant. That greater importance of multinational activities tends to have a positive impact on equilibrium tariff rates seems to be plausible. Indeed, one may hypothesize that governments should care less about exporters if their share in international activities declines.
Or to put it in terms of our discussion in Section 4, the income motive may become stronger 22 In a further experiment that is not displayed in the To embed the empirical results in our theoretical analysis, we have added further simulation exercises, which allow us to investigate the relationship between the volume of (inbound and outbound) FDI and (Nash) tariff rates, and FDI-variation is generated by changes in investment cost parameter . The simulation exercises, which are based on the same parameter values as those depicted in Figure 3 , are available from the authors on request.
They reveal that the positive relationship between higher outbound FDI and higher equilibrium tariff rates is consistent with our theoretical analysis. Also, for certain (low) levels of investment cost parameter (and a given ) the numerical experiments indicate a positive relationship between the sum of inbound and outbound FDI and the Nash tariff rate of a particular economy. Only the positive impact of inbound FDI is difficult to interpret against the background of our simulation results. 
Conclusions
This paper presents a general equilibrium, two-country model with co-existence of exporters and horizontal multinational firms to study non-cooperative best-response tariff setting in the presence of FDI. For symmetric countries, we show analytically that tariffs are strategic complements in Nash equilibrium. A rigorous discussion of how asymmetries in factor endowments and the investment costs of multinationals influence equilibrium tariff rates is provided by reference to numerical simulation exercises. Our theoretical findings indicate that factor endowments, and non-tariff impediments to trade and investment are important determinants of Nash tariff rates.
Based on our theoretical insights, we set up an empirical model that investigates the main determinants of tariff rates and slopes of reaction functions in the Nash equilibrium. We use a panel dataset of trade-weighted most-favoured-nation tariff rates for a total of 44 economies, 
it follows from (2) that ( ) 
In total analogy, we can calculate 
We can use (16) and (17) to define ( ) partner country is not a trivial result but is rigorously analysed in Egger, Egger and Greenaway (2005) . To save on space, we refer the interested reader to this paper for technical details. 
